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THE ORDEAL OF SHELTER: CONTINUITIES AND
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE PUBLIC RESPONSE
TO HOMELESSNESS
KIM

HOPPER*

Late in the ill-fated 1988 Democratic bid for the presidency, but still early enough for the outcome to be in doubt,
the writer Joan Didion was traveling with the Dukakis campaign. She discovered that some of the young team of advisers,
policy analysts and media consultants that the candidate had
assembled around him had taken to referring to themselves as
"the best and the brightest." They did this, Didion reports,
"with no sense of irony and none, therefore, of history."'
Santayana, of course, had said it earlier. And before him,
Marx (echoing Hegel) had remarked how all great events and
personages on the world stage occurred twice-the first time as
history, the second as farce. No one even remotely conversant
with the shambles of the emergency shelter effort in our country today can fail to be impressed with the wisdom of these
observations; or to be dismayed, as if additional reason for dismay were needed, at the lack of familiarity with even rudimentary Poor Law history on the part of our policy makers.
But it is not merely ignorance of precedent that cripples
the effort. It is, I would suggest, a set of fundamental tensions
at the core of the provision of public shelter, tensions that have
their roots in the elemental ambiguities that permeate the
problem of how-under what terms and conditions, and protected by what safeguards-are public resources to be used for
meeting private needs in market-based economies.

I.

THE HOMELESS IN HISTORY

Old Homer had it right: there is nothing so charged with
sentiment as the unexpected homecoming of a loved oneespecially when that arrival means setting right a gross injustice. Even the most jaded undergraduate can barely suppress a
cheer when, in that final scene of The Odyssey, a disguised Odysseus reveals his identity and routs the parasites who have been
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Anthropology, New School for Social
Research, New York.
1. New York Review of Books, October 27, 1988, at 19.
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pestering his wife, humiliating his son and squandering his
wealth. Odysseus had returned home clad in the rags of a beggar, a figure that was held in low regard by the ancient Greeks.2
To press the point, Homer had earlier on, in a textbook
instance of dramatic irony, set us up nicely for that rousing
conclusion. It is an offhand remark about beggars by (of all
people) a swineherd, but it does the job:
Wandering men tell lies for a night's lodging, for fresh
clothing; truth doesn't interest them. 3
Mythology may alert us to the abiding resonances of
"home," but it was government's responsibility for the room
and board of itinerant strangers and the local "friendless poor"
that would provoke the debates over the terms, conditions and
the telltale signs of "deservingness" that are with us even
today.
The situation of the dependent poor, and the basis and
stipulations of public provision for their support, have been
troublesome issues for Western governments since they were
first broached in a systematic way in the sixteenth century.4
The earliest attempt to design a comprehensive public relief
apparatus, De Subventione Pauperum (1526), was the work of
Thomas More's friend, the Spanish scholar Juan de Vives, at
the behest of the good citizens of Bruges. They were especially
struck by the importunings of beggars lining the way to the
cathedral-thrusting oozing stumps in the faces of churchgoers, displaying sickly infants, and otherwise making a menace of
their appeal for alms. Vives' treatise draws an explicit connection between poverty and crime and makes it clear that the
chief impetus behind a decent provision for the poor is civic
self-interest. For when the indigent, "driven by need," turn to
"open brigandage" or "thieve in secret" it will be too late; the
welfare of the entire community will have been jeopardized.
(Elsewhere, Vives compares the threat of mendicancy to that of
the plague.)
2.

"A thes [a propertyless laborer who worked for hire when he could

find it and begged a living otherwise], not a slave, was the lowest creature on
earth that Achilles could think of. The terrible thing about a thes was his lack
of attachment, his not belonging." M.I. FINLEY, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS 57
(2d ed.
3.
4.
(1926);

1978).
The Odyssey 251 (R. Fitizgerald, trans.) (1961).
See generally P. SALTER, SOME EARLY TRACTS ON POOR RELIEF XV-XX
N.Z. Davis, Poor Relief Humanism, and Heresy: The Case of Lyon, 5

STUDIES MED. & RENAISSANCE HIST. (1968); J. GARRATY, UNEMPLOYMENT IN
HISTORY (1978); G. HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY (1983).
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Vives' solution, one that will be replayed in many variations by governments down to our own, is first to classify the
needy by circumstance and ability and then to devise corrective
measures accordingly. Above all, recipients of relief were to be
set to work. Those without a trade would be taught one; those
competent in one would be given an opportunity to practice it,
either by local merchants or in state-subsidized workshops.
Few are exempt: the elderly and simple-minded could be
taught "to dig, to draw water, to sweep, to push a barrow, to be
an usher in court, to be a messenger;" even the blind could be
taught to sing, play an instrument, turn a lathe or spin. The
basic premise had a brutal simplicity about it: "no one is so
enfeebled as to have no power at all for doing something."'
Canon Law had charted the course for learned discourse
much earlier. Ecclesiastical attention to the problem of almsgiving dates at least from the time of the late patristic writings
of Augustine, who counseled against giving alms to those who
"neglected righteousness." By the twelfth century, Church
commentaries on the Decretum of Gratian had identified the
core issues that would henceforth command the attention of
relief specialists:
[W]hether eligibility for relief should be determined by
need alone or by other considerations, whether there
should be any fixed order of preference among eligible
applicants, whether the principle of selection should be
conditioned by a desire to reform or, alternatively, to
punish, the pauper seeking relief.6
This growing rationalization of charity went along with a
changed attitude toward poverty. By the thirteenth century,
the high medieval attitude that had prized poverty as a purification state-one that was personified in the figure of Francis of
Assisi-was in abeyance and would soon be supplanted altogether.7 There were a number of reasons for this change.
First, what had been founded as mendicant orders of friars
(Franciscan and Dominican especially) had grown rich and
complacent over time. Disillusionment and indignation
followed. 8
5. de Vives, De Subventione Pauperum, in P. SALTER, supra note 4.
6. Tierney, The Decretists and the Deserving Poor, 1 COMP. STUD. SOC. &
HIST. 341 (1959-60).
7. A.L. BEIER, MASTERLESS MEN 4-5 (1985).

8.

"[Mlendicity is now their trade, which some practice well, others

better; miracles of self-denial are demanded of them, and behold, on the
contrary, prodigies of selfishness. It is no longer religion, it is their order

304

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

Second, the composition of the poor had changed as a
consequence of the dislocations of war, plague, economic displacement, and civil uprising. No longer were the roads home
largely to the aged, infirm and pilgrims; now they were joined
by brigands, demobilized soldiers, and peasants released from
the manor (especially in the period following the Black Death).
Word had it that the arduous journeys of many "pilgrims" were
rather chiefly pleasure trips, and the rowdy example of janglers, tale-tellers and liars was thought to be "an encouragement to laziness and idle living." 9
Third, not only had the Church desanctified poverty, it had
elevated industry to a virtue. The obligation to work was now
seen as an essential part of human nature. Though by no
means a wholesale transformation, the new emphasis is quite
striking in some popular confessional guides. Labor, which, in
Gregory the Great's exegesis of the Book of Job, had meant
"suffering," came to mean "work;" quies, which for Augustine
had signified "tranquillity," became synonymous with laziness.
The old anchorite vice of acedia (the temptation to neglect
one's spiritual exercises or seek release from the rigors of a
desert monk's life) was "laicized." By the late Middle Ages, the
sin of sloth included not only spiritual slackness, but the
neglect of one's worldly responsibilities as well.' 0
Lastly, of course, the sheer numbers of the wandering
poor had reached numbers never seen before.'"
The Church's recasting of "holy poverty" in the late Middle Ages set the stage for a decidedly less benevolent, more
discerning and demanding attitude on the. part of people at
large toward the dependent poor. Formerly, writes Braudel,
"the beggar who knocked at the rich man's door was regarded
as a messenger from God, and might even be Christ in disguise." With the roads swollen by the addition of large numbers of displaced laborers, ex-soldiers, robbers, and occasional
bands of vagrants, only the foolhardy still believed such
notions. No longer was the legitimacy of need, in this the lowest station of a pauper's life, to be taken as self-evident. The
figure of the beggar became suspect and the poor at large were
tainted by association: "Idle, good for nothing and dangerous,
which must be protected."
MIDDLE AGES 298 (1897).
9.
Id. at 350-51.

J.

JUSSERAND,

ENGLISH WAYFARING

LIFE IN THE

86-90, 174-75 (1967).

10.

S.

WENZEL, THE SIN OF SLOTH

11.

F.

BRAUDEL, THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE

506-12 (1982).
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was the verdict passed on the destitute by a society terrified by
the rising tide of mendicancy."' 2
Nor, experience would soon teach, was there much hope
that this rising tide was a transient thing. As the years passed,
the numbers of the poor continued to grow, and it was this
"conjuncture of older problems with poverty, with population
growth and economic expansion" that spurred the "international movement for welfare reform" on the European continent in the sixteenth century. 3 The forces behind this
conjuncture, in the main, are not difficult to identify. As capitalism began its slow ascendancy to a global economic system,1 4 the settled verities of the feudal world gradually came
undone. Custom would give way to competition, the security
of a manor-bound peasantry would yield to the uncertainty of
the landless proletariat, and the medieval institution of charity
would soon prove unequal to the task of assistance. One cardinal feature of this need was its routine character: "destitution
[emerged] as a normal5 and not, as heretofore, an abnormal ele'
ment in social life."'
The sheer volume of need with which cities and parishes
were expected to cope, more than anything else, probably
explains the uniform move toward rationalized poor relief at
this time. In order that the growing ranks of the innocent poor
(those whose "infirmities were merely providential," as Defoe
would later put it) might be justly served, it was necessary to
devise means of distinguishing them from those whose need
was counterfeit. The attempt to divide the villainy of "sturdie
beggars and vagabonds" from the true need of the "impotent
poor" was the first of many to draw workable
distinctions
16
between the deserving and undeserving poor.
And so, with a force wholly out of proportion to his actual
contribution to the social burden of dependency, the figure of
the vagrant would assume a pivotal role in the development of
public policy toward the indigent. The Webbs, for example,' 7
argued that the roots of state poor relief schemes are to be
found in these early efforts to control the wandering poor. In
the ensuing centuries, forced imprisonment, compulsory work,
banishment, branding, pillory, and torture would all be
12. Id. at 508.
13. N.Z. DAVIS, supra note 4, at 258, 267.
14. See generally I. WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN
15. P. SALTER, supra note 4, at xvi.
16. J.

supra note 4, at 27.

17.

B.

GARRATY,
S. WEBB &

WORLD SYSTEM

WEBB, ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY

(1974).

350 (1927).
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resorted to as means of curbing the movements of the rootless
poor.18

In retrospect, the fear animating such repressive measures
appears to have been threefold. In an era when footpads and
highwaymen made road travel hazardous, vagrants were widely
assumed to be robbers in disguise. Even when a beggar's
harmlessness could be vouched for, the integrity of his need
was open to question; many believed that he could find work or
secure assistance elsewhere if only he would try. Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, the example of the vagrant (especially in a society soon to be introduced to the discipline of the
factory on a massive scale) was thought to pose a threat: if idleness could be turned to profit, or at least assured subsistence,
how then could the ranks of "free labor" be harnessed to arduous and ill-paid jobs? So long as it could be pursued with
impunity, vagrancy was a standing mockery of the decent
poor's submission to the new regime of work.
Animus toward the vagrant, of course, sufficed in the long
run neither to discipline the working poor nor to deter the
needy. But the intent was there, an insistent reminder of the
necessity to discriminate among classes of the potentially
dependent poor. 9 Need must be reasoned if the public fisc is
to be protected, the insidious example of the idle be quelled,
and the outlandish notion that a livelihood might be had with20
out being earned kept in check. If envy is a revolutionary sin,
refusal to work is its secular accessory. Vagrancy fed the suspicion among the poor at large that the terms and conditions of
work as they were presently constituted need not be immutable. In a laboring populace whose loyalty to the wage and
shop-floor was tenuous at best, such suspicions bordered on
the seditious.
II.

THE SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF HOMELESSNESS

Homelessness in the most encompassing sense of the term

has to do with various kinds and degrees of residential instability. In the absence of secure and stable dwelling, people have

devised makeshift shelters that span everything from shared
18. K. MARX, CAPITAL (B. Fowkes Rev. ed. 1976) (1st ed. 1867); cf. C.J.
RIBTON-TURNER, A HISTORY OF VAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY AND BEGGARS AND
BEGGING (1887).
19. For a fuller discussion of the "distributive dilemma," see generally
D. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984).
20. M. MOLLAT, THE POOR IN THE MIDDLE AGES: AN ESSAY IN SOCIAL
HISTORY 231 (1986).
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(and overcrowded) living quarters to a nomadic life on the
streets. Officially, only those improvisations that are on display
in public spaces, and the need that declares itself to public or
charitable authorities, are classified as "homeless." Until that
threshold of visibility is crossed, hardship may exist and suffering may occur-but they happen off stage, to people who
although "at risk" are, for the time being, "coping." "Unmet
need," to put it bluntly, is publicly irrelevant need.
My remarks here will shuttle between the narrow, official
definition of homelessness and the broader, increasingly common set of survival strategies that (following Olwen Hufton) I
will refer to as "economies of makeshift."'" Clearly, the precise dimensions of the problem, and the type of coping
arrangements to be considered as legitimate instances of
"homelessness," are contested matters, not likely to be solved
by the wand of classification or the wizardry of statistics. Tradition too has its political aspects and advocacy-not logic-plays
the larger role in reasoning the need.
A.

Varieties of Homelessness

Even in the strict sense adopted here, caution should obviously be exercised in applying the notion of homelessness to
other times, places or cultures. While homelessness probably
occurs in most societies, great variation is found not only in the
forces of displacement but also in the configuration and meaning of the ensuing transient state. Nor is the reference point
against which homelessness is to be measured always clear: the
rudimentary Western notion of home as a place of domesticity
is of comparatively recent origin. Rural housing for the majority of the population of the ancien regime amounted to little more
than hovels, shared with animals, and "fulfilled no social function," not even the minimal one of "serv[ing] as homes for
families." 2 2
Resort to irregular forms of accommodation-what, with
some reservations, might be called "homeless ways of life"may describe the usual situation of whole communities (such as
gypsies, Irish "travellers," or nomadic hunters and gatherers),
or the chosen practice of certain groups (religious mendicants,
warring or hunting parties), or, it can be the lot of specific
occupations (migrant workers, prospectors, itinerant preach21.

0. HuFrON,THE POOR OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE 1750-1789

69-127 (1974).
22. P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 392 (1962); cf F. BRAUDEL,
THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE 283-85 (1981).

308

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4

ers). A kind of professional homelessness may even make its
appearance from time to time, as in the figure of the American
tramp. Official attitudes toward these atypical persons and
practices vary greatly, depending in part (I suggest) on the
threat that such symbols of unearned livelihood are thought to
pose.
For centuries, to take an unusually colorful example, companies of unemployed scholars roved the medieval countryside.
Having taken minor orders in the church, they readily found
refuge at monasteries located a day's walk apart. The custom
was that these guests repaid the hospitality of their hosts with
ribald parodies of liturgical texts and deft lampoons of the
established church. Their antics sufficiently provoked the
church fathers of the day that denunciations of this ordo vagorum
were regular items on the calendar of Council proceedings
from the thirteenth century on. The Church's patience eventually wore thin and repressive measures were enacted. Vagrant
clerics were shorn of their tonsure (and thus deprived of their
protection against secular justice) and ecclesiastics who sheltered them were subject to fine or imprisonment.23
(If I may digress for the moment: I take it that one lesson
of this medieval episode is that the privileges of even honorable mendicants were conditioned upon political tolerance ' of
both their numbers and whatever cultural "commentary 24
they dared to offer. A similar rule may well apply today to
some of the more energetic efforts to rid city streets of mendicants and sidewalk dwellers.)
Occasionally, the distinctive niche recognized as homeless
was occupied by a miscellany of players, with little in common
other than their mobility. In fourteenth century England, for
example, "wayfaring" was an established way of life. The minstrels, laborers, musicians, pardoners, "pedlars" and pilgrims
who made up its ranks provided valuable communication links
between distant regions. 25 (And, just as the legacy of the wandering scholar is preserved in the Carmina Burana, so that of the
wayfarer comes down to us as The Canterbury Tales.) But even
recognizing their useful function, the wayfarers could not
escape the traditional suspicion of strangers, a suspicion aggra23. See H. WADDELL, THE WANDERING SCHOLARS 161-84 (1927).
24. For a fascinating discussion of distinctive psychiatric disorders as
cultural "commentary," see Karp, Deconstructing Culture-Bound Syndromes, 21
Soc. ScI. & MED. 221 (1985).
25. J. JUSSERAND, supra note 8.
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vated by the predations of robbers and the lawless example of
runaway serfs.2 6
In eighteenth century France, an enumeration of the population on the road reads like an inventory of misfortune and
artifice:
[W]idows, orphans, cripples . . .journeymen who had

broken their contracts, out-of-work laborers, homeless
priests with no living, old men, fire victims . . .war vic-

tims, deserters, discharged soldiers and even officers ...
would-be vendors of useless articles, vagrant preachers
with or without licenses, 'pregnant servant-girls and
unmarried mothers driven from home,' children sent out
'to find bread or to maraud' . . . strolling players whose
music was an alibi....
Many others, Braudel remarks, were "virtually homeless, living
in makeshift shelters (what we would call shanty-towns). 28
And if random adversity was responsible for the displacement
of some, the closer one gets to the modern period the more
chronic is uncertainty about sources of subsistence
and the
29
more routine is irregularity in ways of life.

B. A Confusion of Tongues
Diversity in form and content is the rule not only of the
appearance but also of the names by which homelessness has
been known. Victorian England would have recognized as
"homeless" those whom its Elizabethan forebears would have
hunted down as "masterless men;" each era would have readily
identified the other's "vagrants." Late nineteenth century
America would excoriate as "tramps" what New England colonists had occasion to refer to as "the strolling poor." 30 In the
early decades of the twentieth century, America's "hobo" was
equivalent to Canada's "bunkhouse man. "31 Closer to the
present, when the Saturday Evening Post asked "Will Ours be the
Century of Homeless People? ' 32 it had in mind not the dis26.
27.
28.

A.L. BEIER, supra note 7.
F. BRAUDEL, supra note 11, at 510-511.
F. BRAUDEL, supra note 22, at 285.

29. See generally K.
295-296 (1985).

NORBERG, RICH AND POOR IN GRENOBLE,

1600-1814

30. Jones, The Strolling Poor: Transiency in Eighteenth-CenturyMassachusetts,

8J.

28 (1975).
See generally N. ANDERSON,

Soc. HIST.

31.

BUNKHOUSE MAN

THE HOBO

(1923) and E.

BRADWIN, THE

(1928).

32. Will Ours be the Century of Homelessness, 232
10 (September 12, 1958).

SATURDAY EVENING POST
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placed poor but the vast numbers of political refugees that
were making their ways to new lives across the globe.
Even today, certain anachronisms seem bound to sow confusion in the minds of urban visitors. Along Manhattan's thoroughfares, for example, there regularly appear small yellow
signs, discolored by age, with the words "Public Shelter" and
an arrow directing one to a nearby building. Official capacity is
also given. These signs refer not (as a perusal of the local press
might lead one to suppose) to refuges for the homeless poor,
but to civil defense precautions taken thirty years ago in surreal
expectation of surviving an atomic war.
Nor is terminological ambiguity the exclusive preserve of
the observer. In the course of my own fieldwork (and the
observation has been reported by others as well), I regularly
met people living on the street or in public places who denied
being homeless. In the minds of some, such a term should be
restricted to those of their compatriots who were clearly disordered in mind.
III.

CORE THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF HOMELESSNESS

That public provision of shelter has suffered from a kind of
institutional amnesia is not a novel observation. Writing in
1934, by which time the lodging house rolls were at an all time
high and the city had logged over a century's experience in
dealing with the problems of street beggars and the shelterless
poor, one seasoned observer wondered if anything had been
learned:
Dependent homeless persons have always been a problem in New York City and, whether by discipline or charity, or both, the attention of the public has been
challenged on numerous occasions. Each time the public
seems to have met the challenge in the easiest and most
expedient manner, with very little reference to previous
experience and only intermittent, casual interest in the
future. 3
Specific measures to relieve the hardship of the homeless
poor came into existence in the mid-nineteenth century in New
York. In part, this was owing to a larger movement to differentiate subclasses of deviancy.3 4 The upshot was that for the first
time being homeless was recognized as a distinctive circum33.
34.
DEVIANT -

N. ANDERSON,
See A. SCULL,

THE HOMELESS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (1934).
DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE

A RADICAL VIEW 26-31 (1977).
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stance of need, one that would no longer be exhaustively
defined by the traditional term vagrancy. Reformers were
quick to perceive subcategories among the homeless poor and
to propose appropriate measures to deal with each accordingly.
Specialized and, for once, nonpunitive public shelters (rooms
in police station houses) were designated for the use of the
homeless. In a marked departure from the all-encompassing
regimen of the old institutions of "indoor relief," use of these
makeshift shelters was haphazard, part-time, on a first-come
first-served basis, and entailed no submission to rules beyond
the modest requirement of not interfering with the right of
others in similar straits to get a night's rest. These were, in a
word, marginal institutions, rigged up to meet a need that
would otherwise have gone unheeded. They functioned by
default not design. And they mark the initiation of a policy of
improvisation that has endured to the present.
The history of the public response to homelessness can be
described by identifying the core themes that have dominated
the enterprise from the beginning.
A.

Damaged, DisagreeablePeople

Despite stubborn indications to the contrary, homelessness has traditionally been viewed as a problem of troubledand troublesome-individuals. The terms of opprobrium have
changed, from the allegations of "barbarism" favored by nineteenth century reformers to the diagnosis of impaired capacity
for social connectedness favored by latter-day sociologists, but
the logic has not. Whether by predisposition, slow decline, or
sudden trauma, this argument runs, such people are damaged
and their homelessness serves merely to confirm and compound that fact.
Nineteenth-century reformers were convinced that the
tramp was a kind of genetic throwback, an only partially civilized "savage," whose primitive nature was but tenuously held
in check. Turn-of-the-century observers held up alcoholism, a
congenital antipathy to work, and "feeble-mindedness" as the
chief causes. Postwar analysts of "skid row" society saw "disaffiliation"-an inability to form, or refusal to abide by, the ties
that bind us together as members of a common society-at the
heart of the problem. Commentators on homelessness today
refer to the deranged biochemistry of the urban street-dweller;
to deficits in their ability to engage and sustain informal networks of support; and to a too-ready willingness on the part of
shelter users to take municipal authorities on "a good housing
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deal." '3 5 In each instance, the assumption is that the distinctive
shape of a social niche is best explained by examining the traits
of its occupants.
In a word, the appeal of such an approach could be
summed up as convenience. For if it is the character faults or
pathology of the poor that best accounts for their poverty, then
the deeper structural questions that their disturbing presence
might otherwise provoke may be safely ignored.
B.

Relieffor a Price

Not only poor relief (institutional or office-based) was governed by the principle of "less eligibility,"3 " but emergency
shelter was as well. Proof of neediness was assessed in several
ways. Submission to interrogation to determine whether one
had responsible relatives in the area, and willingness to perform work (usually splitting wood or doing chores around the
facility) or to endure a sermon in exchange for bed and board,
were the most common. Artful lodgers could sometimes find
their way around these requirements. But the essential "means
test" was simplicity itself; the mere fact that one was willing to
put up with the wretched conditions in the almshouse or
municipal lodging hose or police station house was de facto
proof of the desperation of one's straights.
Given the condition of housing in the late nineteenth century city, strict enforcement of the principle of less eligibility
would have amounted to an invitation to cruelty. In fact,
reformers of that day repeatedly expressed their frustration at
seasonal almshouse residents who found the facility-spartan
and unforgiving as it was-of superior quality to their usual
digs. Even so, the notion continued to hold sway and proved
remarkably resistant to fluctuating circumstances. As shelter
directors were quick to realize and powerless to change, the
institutional routine was a rigid one, unvarying even when
thousands of normally working men showed up at the shelter
door. To have altered the routine, to have made allowances for
a "different class of homeless man" (as some private shelters
did during times of economic depression), would have been to
confront the founding principle and operating premise of such
institutions: these were temporary makeshift shelters, not sub35.
36.

Main, The Homeless of New York, 72 PuB. INTEREST 3 (1983).
The principle of less eligibility states that the situation of the

assisted pauper was to be less attractive (or "eligible") than that of the most
menial laborer, so as to keep sharp the spur of necessity and preserve the
incentive to work.
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sidized alternatives, and anyone contemplating a longer stay
had better think twice. 3 7 Writing in the pages of The New
Republic in 1933, Matthew Josephson was astonished to discover that shelter policy, in the midst of the worst depression
had ever seen, was still "premised on the theory of
the country
3'
the bum."1

C.

An Institutional Hybrid

Repeatedly, shelter administrators have been vexed to
learn that this one facility was saddled with two quite contrary
tasks. For the most part, it was to serve as a refuge of last resort
for institutional castoffs, "inappropriate referrals," and people
for whom the idea of the structured life of "indoor relief" was
anathema-it had inherited, in short, the catch-all function of
the colonial almshouse. In addition, as conditions in the labor
market would demand, it was to be pressed into service as the
temporary bivouac for the "reserve army" of the new industrial
capitalist order. It was expected to be both a place of rehabilitation-"a great human repair shop" in Commissioner Kingsbury's phrase (1914)-and a public lodging house-a flop,
where penniless men could find a bed and a meal. The two
functions demanded wholly different programs and in the end
neither took precedence. Instead, as Stuart Rice put it, an
"incoherent in policy and
"institutional hybrid" evolved,
39
extravagant in operation."

The same contradiction plagued the emergency programs
for the homeless in the 1930s4 ' and has returned to haunt contemporary shelters. At heart, the fundamental issue is not the
quality of the shelters themselves, but an enduring ambivalence
toward this category of relief whatever its guise.
37. In fact, for most of its history, the municipal lodging house in New
York enforced monthly limits of stay.
38. Josephson, The Other Nation, 75 New Republic 16 (May 17, 1933).
39. Rice, The Failure of the Municipal Lodging House, 11 NAT'L. MUN. REV.

358-59 (1922).
40.

"In the care of [the local homeless] there had been neither

application of the generally accepted standards of institutional care required
of other city departments furnishing institutional care on a long time basis,
nor the recognition of individual budgetary needs generally accepted in the
care of resident families on relief. . . . A philosophy of temporariness
characterized the program..." GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT,
PUBLIC RELIEF FOR TRANSIENT AND NON-SETrLED PERSONS IN THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 145 (1936).
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InstitutionalDeterrence vs. PopularMakeshifts

Much as had been the case with reformist campaigns
against street-begging, popular practice was out of joint with
public policy with respect to the principle of "less eligibility"
and the institution of the "means test." Professional charity
railed against "indiscriminate alms-giving;" common folks
found it awkward and demeaning to try to divide "deserving"
from "undeserving" and organized drives to distribute food,
fuel and clothing during times of acute need. More pervasive
still were the varieties of unobtrusive aid, the everyday practices of sharing and support to which ordinary people resorted
as routine matters. These things were done quietly, out of
sight, without any public declaration of need, and thus for the
most part have eluded the social scientist's prying gaze.
The ingenuity and improvisations of the unemployed and
their families that would so impress social scientists in the
Great Depression were already well-established traditions
among the urban poor in the late nineteenth century. 4 I Hardship, bad luck and spells of real scarcity were familiar to working-class households and formal institutional aid, especially if it
meant enduring humiliating rites of admittance and a bed in
the anonymous democracy of a public flophouse, was an act of
uncommon desperation. Recourse to kinship and custom-not
the state-was the usual means for dealing with misfortune.
The larger story of emergency shelter is thus the informal
one, and a cardinal feature of that assistance is that the need it
meets never becomes a statistic of official relief. Acknowledged
or not, the support extended by kin and neighbors was an
indispensable prop-and continues to be an indispensable
prop-to the formal relief apparatus charged with sheltering
the homeless.
IV.

CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

The homeless crisis besetting our cities today is of a markedly different sort than that traditionally dealt with in American
urban settings. Still, while the singularities of the contemporary scene are striking, they should not be allowed to mask
enduring staples of the public response to homelessness.
41. A. KEYSSAR, OUT OF WORK: THE FIRST CENTURY OF UNEMPLOYMENT
IN MASSACHUSETT-S 156 (1986).
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A.

Discontinuities

1. Geography:
Public homelessness and the institutions set up to relieve it
are far more spatially dispersed phenomena in most cities
today than at any time since the Great Depression. Skid row,
that repository of official homelessness in the postwar era, has
long since outgrown its former boundaries as a zone of disgraced social identity. The sheer visibility of much urban
homelessness is markedly at odds with its picture in the past,
again excepting periods of severe depression.
2.

Demography:

The homeless poor today are a more diverse population,
one more obviously drawn from a cross-section of the urban
poor, than at any time in the past. To take just two indicators:
families make up the fastest growing subgroup within the class,
and impoverished ethnic minorities are found in much higher
proportions than in the population at large.4 2 (Much variation
is found regionally, of course.) At the same time, there are
great differences in the mobility of local homeless populations,
with western and southern areas tending to see more transient
populations. Finally, although often overemphasized in popular accounts, the presence of unusually high frequencies of
severe psychiatric disabilities among the homeless poor cannot
be denied. The most recent authoritative review finds that in
well-designed studies the prevalence of current mental illness
ranges from 28 to 37 percent. Compared to their nondisabled
counterparts, the psychiatrically disabled homeless differ
chiefly in being homeless for longer periods and in having less
contact with friends and family, more with the criminal justice
system, and fewer employment prospects.43
3.

Structural causes:

Marked changes in the segmented composition of the
labor force-and not, as was typically the case in the past, massive unemployment-figures centrally among the structural facgenerally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
A REPORT ON THE 1988 NATIONAL SURVEY OF SHELTERS FOR
(1989).
43. They do not differ with respect to age, sex, ethnicity, residential
history, substance abuse, or the role of economic factors or family crisis in
causing their homelessness. See R.C. TESSLER & D. L. DENNIS, A SYNTHESIS
42.

See

DEVELOPMENT,
THE HOMELESS

OF NIMH-FUNDED RESEARCH CONCERNING PERSONS WHO ARE HOMELESS AND
MENTALLY ILL 28, 36 (February 1989).
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tors behind contemporary homelessness. The emerging
polarized labor market of high tech, highly skilled, professional
service jobs at one end, and low-paid, menial service work
(maintenance, clerical, delivery) and some residual manufacturing at the other, coupled with the deteriorating situation of
poor households at large, is what makes for the pronounced
marginality of young black men in particular (in places like New
York, the largest group of shelter users).4 4 Abetting both these
factors is a new dynamic of scarcity in urban housing markets.
Briefly, this is a function of changed urban land values, the loss
of much older low-cost housing (especially residential hotels),
growing demand for higher priced dwellings, and a diminished
capacity on the part of many poor households to keep up with
rising rents. The net effects are an intensified demand for an
increasingly scarce good-affordable housing-and, in many
quarters, the mounting suspicion that to trust in the self-corrective tendencies of the market to rectify the situation is sheer
folly.
4.

Advocacy:

An older, long dormant tradition of self-mobilization
among the homeless poor has recently resurfaced and
promises to be a shaping force in future advocacy efforts. Similarly, guerilla theatre-public marches and demonstrations,
prolonged fasts and encampments, disruptions of official ceremonies-has played an important role in training popular
attention on the issue. Organized lobbying and legislative
action have begun to bear substantial fruit as well.4 5 But the
most distinctive feature of contemporary advocacy efforts to
date has been the role of the courts, and the original right to
shelter case will be examined in some detail below.
B.

Continuities

1. Marginal people/Liminal relief:
For the most part, public shelters continue to be physically
and socially segregated, their institutional space mimicking the
social status of their residents. The isolating and often forbidding character are elements in the traditional policy of deterrence. In New York, abandoned schools and psychiatric
44. See HOPPER, SUSSER, & CONOVER, Economies of Makeshift:
Deindustrializationand Homelessness in New York City, 14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY
183 (1986).
45. Notably in the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987).
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facilities, armories, refurbished troopships and ferries, andthe ideal site since the middle of the nineteenth centuryislands, have emerged as the preferred sites for new shelters.
2.

Almshouses in all but name:

Recycled but unrecognized as such, the "undifferentiated"
almshouse function has survived in the guise of contemporary
shelters. With the exception of a recent (and only partially
implemented) move to restrict certain shelters or sections of
shelters to specific clientele-men participating in work programs, ex-patients, men with outside jobs-the vast, cavernous
facilities have been home indifferently to people of all manner
of need and handicap. As early as the mid-1970s, moreover, it
was clear to shelter staff that this erstwhile skid row haven had
become the newest "dumping ground" for the misfits and discards of other public facilities. That recurring failure of the
nineteenth century almshouse-proper "classification'"-has
been recycled along with the institution itself.
3.

The poor bear the burden:

Finally, as researchers in Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Chicago and New York have all found,4 6 official shelter rolls tell
only part of the story. The larger part of the emergency assistance burden is borne today, as it was in the nineteenth century,
by poor households themselves. By rough estimates, the scale
of "doubled up" families in public housing alone in New York
City outnumbers those who are officially homeless by 20 to 1.
V.

THE ROLE OF LEGAL ADVOCACY

Arguably the most distinctive feature of the current public
policy deliberations has been the role of legal advocacy.4 7 At
no time in the history of public shelter has the court played so
central and persisting a role as in the original right to shelter
case, filed in October 1979 on behalf of homeless men in New
46.

See Koegel & Burnam, Traditional and Nontraditional Alcoholics, I I

ALCOHOL HEALTH AND RESEARCH WORLD 28 (1987); I. Piliavin, Stayers and

Leavers among the Homeless, Paper Presented

at the NIAAA

and UCSD

Conference on HOMELESSNESS, ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUGS, San
Diego (February 2-4, 1989); P. Rossi, WITHOUT SHELTER: HOMELESSNESS IN
THE 1980s 37-43 (1989); and Hopper, Susser & Conover, supra note 44.
47. Cf K. Hopper and L. Cox, Litigation in Advocacy for the Homeless, in

HOUSING THE HOMELESS (J. Erickson and C. Whilhelm, Eds. 1986). See also
Langdon & Kass, Homelessness in America: Looking for the Right to Shelter, 19
COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 305 (1985).
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York City, Callahanv. Carey.4 8 After a preliminary injunction in
December 1979 which directed the city to provide shelter to all
"needy, indigent men," the public system began to expand for
the first time in fifteen years. Conditions, however, remained
dismal and the treatment of the men harsh and degrading.
Faced with a situation of de facto deterrence, the advocates
insisted that the case go to trial.
Formal proceedings commenced in December 1980 and
testimony on shelter conditions was solicited from both homeless men and local experts. Confronted with steadily amassing
evidence of the gross insufficiency in capacity and intolerable
situations within the shelter system, abetted by mounting pressure from Judge Richard Wallach, the city and state entered
into prolonged negotiations with counsel for the defense in
early spring 1981. The result, in August 1981, was a courtentered consent decree that not only reaffirmed a right to shelter but set minimal standards of decency for public shelters,
and provided for ongoing monitoring of conditions in them. A
major victory appeared won. No longer would a tradition that
had made contempt for the homeless man its operating premise be acceptable.
In the nearly eight years that have elapsed since, the court
has issued dozens of orders directing the city to comply with
one or another of the terms of the decree. Shelter capacity has
exploded: from a haphazard collection of Bowery flophouses
and floor space at a central intake facility, with a maximum
capacity of 1600, to a network of some twenty shelters throughout the city, with a total bed capacity of over 9,000. Quality,
which had improved in the immediate aftermath of the decree,
now fluctuates considerably, owing both to variations in the
sheer size of facilities (up to 1200 on a single floor) and to the
intensity of demand on a given night. There has been no
noticeable decline in the street-dwelling population; just last
fall (October 1988) a survey by the Transit Authority put the
number of people sleeping in the subway system at over 1400.
Overall costs for emergency shelter in New York City now top
$0.3 billion annually.
A.

Callahan Revisited

Judicial decrees may be blunt instruments for making policy, but the pressure they generate for immediate action, the
continuing oversight by informed parties they offer, and the
48.

5, 1979).

188 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, Col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., December
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leverage they wield with notoriously unresponsive bureaucracies, make them all but matchless as catalysts for reform. At
the same time, severe limitations are placed on the exercise of
that power in practice. The implementation of reforms (especially costly reforms) is subject to myriad compromises and
exceptions; the scope of application may be arbitrarily drawn;
and obsessive concern with the details of the decree and subsequent orders may well eclipse the long-term goal. As such
compromises have multiplied and the shelter system itself has
mushroomed, advocates have found themselves hoist on their
petard-seeking to maintain standards in an emergency enterprise that nearly everyone agrees is a shambles, and that threatens nonetheless to become the "crisis management" solution
to homelessness.
I can put it simply: improvised as temporary measures
under exigent circumstances, these institutional makeshifts
soon developed inertial force of their own. Satellite apparatuses (health, mental health, drug rehab and job training programs) were spun off, adding to the service density of this new
institutional niche. Whole systems evolved where jury-rigged
stopgaps had been planted.
If there is one substantive advance, aside from the sheer
gain in capacity, it is the provision for ongoing monitoring.
Doggedly, the court has refused to cede oversight responsibility for the system, and has proven responsive to evidence of
infractions of the terms of the decree. But if the recent history
of the Willowbrook case is any guide, this will become an
increasingly tenuous position as managerial responsibilities
expand and external pressure mounts for less costly-or, more
to the point, less privileged-forms of relief.
B.

The Willowbrook Consent Decree

Six years into the implementation of a community placement plan for former residents of a state institution for the
developmentally disabled, the state defendants appealed to the
court to relax the size limit on transitional facilities (raising the
ceiling from 15 to 50 beds per facility). The state cited
improved conditions at the Willowbrook hospital, a tightening
real estate market, and growing community opposition in support of its petition. The lower court ruled that the state failed
to show that sufficient cause for a modification of the decree"grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions"applied in this case. To the surprise of nearly all concerned,
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the appeals court reversed. It is the logic of its reasoning that
concerns me.
The appeals court's ruling hinged on what it construed as
the artificiality of the judicial laboratory that had spawned the
consent decree in the first place. "In judicial reform litigation
such as this," the court wrote,
judicially imposed remedies must be open to ... accommodation of a wider constellation of events than is represented in the adversarial setting of the courtroom.' 49
The court took particular note of the exigencies of budgetary constraints and neighborhood resistance to the transitional
housing. The error in the lower court's ruling, in effect, was to
have arrogated to the judiciary decisions about the implementation of public policy that are properly left to the legislature
and the free play of the political arena. In a word, the lower
court had mistaken for an exception a set of interests that warranted no special consideration.
Such a conservative construction of judicial redress was
precisely what city and state defendants had been urging all
along in Callahan. Had it prevailed, the course of public interest litigation in this case would have been rather different.
Indeed, one may already glimpse what the end of an era that
has only recently learned to treat the homeless as exceptions
might look like.
VI.

By

WAY OF CONCLUSION

If not the person, then at least the image of homelessness
has undergone significant rehabilitation in recent years.
Indeed, there is a steadily mounting store of evidence, largely
ethnographic and increasingly longitudinal in nature, that most
homeless people are homeless on an episodic basis; that many
manage to retain old ties and may even cultivate new contacts
with friends and kin who remain housed; that a good many still
work, if only part-time, or at least scavenge in order to lay claim
to some income; that, in short, the received image of the homeless poor as "abject" in their helplessness is dead wrong.
Indeed, there are signs-fleeting and haphazard though they
may be to date-that something of an inversion in our image of
the homeless may be under way. One can discern an almost
celebratory tone in reports that purport to have found surpris49. As cited in D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS
352 (1984).
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ing evidence of resiliency and resourcefulness among some
segments of the homeless poor.
At the same time, however, calls to "Bring Back Asylums''50 resound with numbing frequency in the popular press,
as though disorders of mind-perhaps compounded by
pathologies of place-were the only issue.
My concern is less the accuracy of either of these versions
than it is the implications to which they lend themselves in policy circles. Two proposals in particular I find troublesome.
Both seem to me premised upon a principle of economy of
social effort: resort to old institutions is less costly, in terms
both of cultural reckoning and budgetary outlays, than would
be serious and as yet untried attempts to grapple with the
underlying issues of dispossession and resource scarcity that
widespread homelessness raises.
The first is the recently initiated (October 1987) practice in
New York City of forcibly removing street-dwellers found to be
so "gravely disabled" that they are unable to care for themselves. In the first thirteen months of operation, over 300 persons were admitted to a special unit of a city hospital set up for
this purpose. Over half were subsequently sent to a state hospital where most remain today. (The disposition of the others
discharged is unclear, although it appears that for some
number, families were located and agreed to receive them.)
Recently, the advocates' worst fears about the absence of any
long-term planning for permanent housing for these individuals were confirmed in a breathtaking announcement by the
mayor, made over the objections of two of his commissioners,
that manages to ignore both elementary axioms of community
psychiatry and two decades of bitter experience. Discharge to
the municipal shelter system will henceforth be considered an
"appropriate" aftercare placement for psychiatric patients in
municipal hospitals. 5 '
Two objectives are thus accomplished. By fiat, a reclassification of the figure and meaning of homelessness is effected.
From vagrants to patients: we now know what to do with such
people, where to send them, what they need-at least up to the
time of their discharge, when the warrant of their need again
becomes ambiguous. We need not riddle the awful immediacy
of their presence amidst us, nor invest it with any deeper
resonances than those of mere pathology. We need not ponder what they had been offered, the grounds for their refusal of
50.
51.

Blake Fleetwood, New York Daily News, Apr. 9, 1989, at 1, Col. 1.
New York Times, Mar. 6, 1989, at 16, col. 1.
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past assistance, or the strange logic that may be discerned in
the art of their necessities.
The second achievement merely extends the first: we need
not inquire-because the issue is never seriously broachedinto the specifics of long-term provision for their subsistence.
It is enough, apparently, that the semblance of competent care
has been initiated and the rough theatre of their misery
brought to an end. In the event our memories fail us, eighteen
months later, when we are informed that it was not their homelessness (or, indeed, their hypothesized underlying disorder)
that was the object of the intervention: shelter residents are,
after all, still homeless. It was rather their visibility.
Thus, the shelter, now recast as a quasi-therapeutic institution, is made to reenact not only the legacy of the almshouse
but that of the asylum as well. And, like that nineteenth century institution, it remains,
"a convenient way of getting rid of
52
inconvenient people."

The second proposal, to my mind, is a bit trickier, building
as it does on solid evidence of the support networks of the
urban poor. It has been made most clearly (and, I hasten to
add, constructively) by Peter Rossi.5 3 The suggestion is to subsidize the spontaneous support of kin by establishing a categorical assistance program-Aid to Families with Dependent
Adults. Leave aside for the moment the administrative
nightmare such a program would present; 54 I want to concentrate on the principle of reform it embodies.
As a provisional measure, such an interim proposal has
merit, recognizing as it does the sheer scale of housing development needed to close the gap between need and supply and
the time that will take. The difficulty, of course, is that transitional demands have a way of settling into established precedents. It is that prospect of institutionalizing dependency for
"redundant" adults that I find troubling.
The problem is that the proposal takes dependency as a
given rather than as a contingent status. Arguably, the whole
point of a public assistance program (or a social insurance program, as the European versions are known) is to introduce a
buffer into the interface between worker household and labor
market. Such programs are premised on a recognition, long in
52. A. SCULL, supra note 34, at 33.
53. P. Rossi, supra note 46, at 57-9.
54. Think only of the difficulties of establishing ongoing residence, of
apportioning payment to family and supported member(s), of setting

appropriate eligibility criteria.
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coming and contested in application, that unemployment is not
primarily a function of individual character but of market forces
operating according to their own logic. This logic is indifferent
to the demands on or consequences for the laboring men and
women subject to its sway. Confusions about the causal arrow
in this dynamic have, of course, been the stuff of vigorous
debate for centuries. To take but one instance, throughout the
nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, "vagrancy" was
thought to be the cause of unemployment, rather than the
other way around.5 5
My point is the obvious one: once we accept that failure to
procure a job-even in a labor market as hostile to the skills
and capacities of many minority youth as ours is today-is
equivalent to the surrender of the adult claim to independence,
we will have ceded significant territory in the ground won by
the welfare state in the last fifty years. We can, to my mind, illafford such a concession today, at a time when the mills of
impoverishment grind ever more unerringly in the minority
households of urban areas.
As a stopgap-an emergency, voluntary measure of limited
duration-I can see the point to such a program. But as a longterm measure, it seems to me misguided and defeatist. Far
more productive, I would argue, would be to open debate on
the issue of "General Relief"-at present, a state funded and
administered program of shamefully low benefit levels and
minuscule coverage. That at least would build on the precarious achievements of past struggles to wrest the prospect of
livelihood away from sheer market determination.
These are parlous times for the poor. Formally to assign
responsibility for the provisioning of adult citizens to the
uncertain scaffolding of custom and kinship is to redirect a
demand that ought properly be made of government. That
such a proposal seems, on the face of it, so prudent and wellgrounded is, I would suggest, a measure of the ground we have
lost in the last eight years.

55.
(1973).

See generally P. T.

RINGENBACH, TRAMPS AND REFORMERS,

1873-1916

